William R. Hawkins is Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council.

It is said in military circles that while amateurs speak of weapons, professionals speak of logistics.  This is because it has been known since the ancient days of Clearchus of Sparta that "without supplies neither a general nor a soldier is good for anything." Much of current U.S.  strategy is based on denying supplies to our opponents, from air strikes on transport infrastructure to rapid ground maneuvers to isolate enemy units.  Yet, our own long term planning leaves much to be desired when it comes to insuring that our forces can carry out rapid, high-intensity operations dependent on vast amounts of food, fuel and ammunition.  

The projection of American power into the Persian Gulf to conduct Desert Storm depended on a "steel bridge" of cargo ships stretching around the world.  Unfortunately, because the United States had neglected its maritime industry, it was perilously dependent on foreign interests to support its overseas military operations.

According to the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), nearly 40 percent of unit cargo carried to the Gulf during the months just prior the launch of the Desert Storm offensive came aboard foreign flagged ships.  According to the USTRANSCOM commander at the time, Air Force General Hansford T. Johnson, "availability and timeliness of unit equipment capable ships from both U.S. and worldwide commercial fleets were not adequate to meet the ... surge requirements."

In its assessment of the war effort, USTRANSCOM stated in its 1995 history of the campaign entitled So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, "the U.S. Merchant Marine's severe decline had serious ramifications for national security."

But Desert Storm was eleven years ago, so what has been done in the meantime to improve the situation as the country again prepares for war in the Gulf - this time with far less international diplomatic support? The answer, sadly, is virtually nothing.  The U.S. Merchant Marine is in worse shape now than in 1991, and the shipbuilding industry behind it has also continued to decline over the last decade.

Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee on October 8, current USTRANSCOM commander, Air Force General John W. Handy said, "Only 33% of the vessels we may require reside in our organic fleets.  The remainder of the sealift capacity needed to transport military equipment and supplies comes from the commercial sector." This despite attempts, albeit greatly underfunded, to expand the organic fleet in order to make up for the decline in U.S.-flag commercial shipping.  Gen. Handy warned, "The U.S. commercial maritime industry has been markedly reduced in the face of economic competition from less costly and, in some cases, greatly expanding, foreign firms....The potential erosion and eventual disappearance of a viable U.S. flagged fleet and, ultimately, the U.S. merchant mariner pool, would force increased and potentially total reliance on ships of foreign registry, entrusting precious military cargo to non-U.S. crews in times of great crisis."

The general gave special emphasis to the merchant mariner pool because it is from the ranks of civilian sailors that the U.S. must draw to man the organic fleet.  It is already expensive to build ships that just sit in port awaiting the next war.  It would be even more expensive if these ships were fully manned in peacetime.  Yet, if there is no large and active body of commercial American shipping, there is no pool of qualified sailors to enlist for sea duty.  As Gen.  Handy stated, "Our nation's organic sealift capability, in the form of highly capable prepositioned, fast sealift ships (FSS), large medium speed roll-on and roll-off ships (LMSR), and Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships which provide emergency and surge response capabilities to globally deploy our combat and support forces, would literally be useless without the support of the commercial maritime industry."

The United States' commercial fleet was the largest in the world in 1950, with 3,492 ships when the Korean War broke out.  In 1980, the U.S. merchant marine fleet engaged in international commerce numbered only 165 American controlled ships, employing 13,313 American merchant mariners.  Today, the active commercial fleet numbers a scant 45 ships, employing 2,600 mariners.  Similarly, in 1980 there were 22 shipyards engaged in the construction of oceangoing commercial and naval ships employing 140,000 people.  Today, there are just eight shipyards employing 59,000.

Once again, a vital element of American strength and security has been sacrificed under the banner of "free trade." Foreign ships cost less to build and foreign sailors work for much cheaper wages.  Though the U.S. government pays $100 million in ship subsidies every year and underwrites more than $1 billion in loans, this is a small effort compared to the massive subsidizes paid out in Europe, South Korea and Japan.  American retailers, who import the bulk of foreign goods coming into the U.S., want to use the cheapest transport possible.  So even though the United States is the world's largest trading nation, with $1.7 trillion worth of goods coming and going each year, only four percent of this cargo is carried on American ships.  

Great Britain at its peak was in a similar situation.  It adopted Navigation Acts which required that all ships carrying goods into British ports, regardless of origin, had to be British.  London was thus able to turn its trade leverage into a strategic asset.  Adam Smith approved, writing in The Wealth of Nations, "The defense of Great Britain depends very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping.  The act of navigation, therefore, very properly endeavors to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country."

The U.S. does have a navigation act of its own, but it is a mere shadow of the British version.  The 1920 Jones Act applies only to ships traveling between American ports, not to those coming from overseas.  The few ships still in the U.S.-flag fleet remain so that they can haul products reserved for American ships by law, such as Alaskan oil, government grain, military cargo and domestic shipments to Hawaii and Puerto Rico.  But this isn't enough.

If even Adam Smith knew that some things were too important to be left to "free trade," shouldn't our political leadership?

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